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1. INTRODUCTION 
As the burden borne by the South African taxpayer seems to increase yearly, the 
prudent taxpayer must embrace the various deductions available to him or her in terms 
of the Act1. In order to do so the taxpayer must understand the ambit of each 
deduction so that he or she may plan accordingly. A deduction that has for many years 
granted relief to the weary taxpayer is that contained in Section 1 l(d). 
This section reads as follows "for the purpose of determining the taxable income 
derived by any person from carrying on a trade within the Republic, there shall be 
allowed a deduction from the income of such person so derived -
( d) expenditure actually incurred during the year of assessment on repairs of property 
occupied for the purpose of trade or in respect of which income is receivable, 
including expenditure so incurred on the treatment against attack by beetles of any 
timber forming part of such property and sums expended for the repairs of 
machinery, implements, utensils and other articles employed by the taxpayer for the 
purpose of his trade." 
In order to appreciate the ambit of the deduction contained in Section 11 ( d), I intend 
to consider this subsection in detail and have elected to concentrate on repairs effected 
to property. More specifically, I will investigate what constitutes a repair for the 
purpose of the Act, concentrating on the principles relating to repairs contained in 
1 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
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ITC 6172. Furthermore, I will address the question of the trade requirements 
contained in Section l l(d). 
2. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE WORD "REPAIR" 
In ITC 2383 Manfred Nathan KC, endorsing the approach in ITC 1224._ states that 
"(t)he Act does not contain any definition of"repairs" and it must be taken, as has been 
previously laid down in income tax cases, that the word repairs must be understood in 
the ordinary natural sense of the word, and according to its ordinary grammatical 
meaning. "5 
Manfred Nathan KC further clarified the meaning of the term "repairs" in ITC 491 6. 
Here the taxpayer sought to deduct the expense of tiling the leased premises from 
which he carried on a butcher's business. The necessity of tiling the building arose as 
the result of a Municipal by-law7. The court held that "in the ordinary sense of the 
term "repairs" means the replacement or renewal of something which has become 
defaced or worn out or worn down by using or possibly by wear and tear ( - although 
there is provision under Section l 1(2)(d) of the Act relating to wear and tear) ... it will 
be necessary for the applicant to show that one of these physical causes has occurred"8. 
On the facts, the court found that "there is no proof of such a physical cause of the 
breaking down of the property or the deterioration in its condition so as to necessitate 
2 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
3 (1932) 6 SATC 353 
4 (1928) 4 SATC 353 
5 ITC 238 (1932) 6 SATC 353 at 354 
6 (1941) 13 SATC 77 
7 ITC 491 (1941) 13 SATC 77 at 78. 
8 ITC 491 (1941) 13 SATC 77 at 77 - 78 
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repairs. "9 The tiling was thus not a repair and expenditure incurred in so doing was 
not deductible as it was of a capital nature. 
The above requirement that some physical deterioration must have occurred in order 
for the expenditure incurred to constitute repairs has been accepted and applied by 
subsequent cases. In ITC 57610 faced with facts similar to the abovementioned hapless 
butcher, the court applied the decision ofITC 491 11 
Similarly in ITC 821 12 Newton Thompson J stated that '"repairs' has a very ordinary 
meaning. It is a thing that you repair if you put it back to where it was, as far as 
possible. But in this case the building was perfectly alright; it had to be broken down 
in order to enable the boiler to be put in; then it had to be built up again because it had 
been broken down. I do not think that in the ordinary use of the words that could 
possibly be regarded as a repair". 13 
Nowhere is the importance of physical deterioration more clearly illustrated than in 
ITC 1264 14. Here the taxpayer's hotel premises were incorporated into a municipal 
area resulting in him being obliged to make use of the municipal sewerage system. The 
taxpayer converted to the required sewerage system and attempted to deduct the cost 
of so doing, as a repair. After his objection to the secretary's disallowance was 
9 ITC 491 (1941) 391 13 SATC 77 at 78 
10 (1944) 13 SATC 485 
11 (1941) 12 SATC 77 
12 (1955) 21 SATC 75 
13 ITC 821 (1955) 21 SATC 75 at 75. 
14 (1977) 39 SATC 133 
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overruled, the taxpayer appealed to the Special Court. Here he led evidence that 
established that although the taxpayer had apparently not previously been fully aware 
of the situation, the work of conversion had revealed that much of the existing 
drainage system was faulty and obsolete, constituted a potential health hazard, and 
needed to be replaced15 As in the abovementioned cases ofITC 491 16 and ITC 57617, 
the taxpayer in ITC 126418 was "not motivated by any desire to repair his property ... 
but was forced by the municipality to install a new system" 19. However, unlike in the 
abovementioned ITC 491 20 and ITC 57621 , in ITC 12622 there was physical 
deterioration requiring repair. 
Thus the question which had to be addressed was whether the taxpayer's state of mind 
was relevant ( did he have to be motivated by a desire to repair his property) or 
whether the test for repairs was an objective one requiring only a consideration of the 
physical state of the object. In ITC 126423 , GrosskopfJ addressed this issue stating 
that he did not "think that the appellant's (taxpayer's) state of mind or his degree of 
knowledge of the circumstances is a relevant factor. Where property is claimed to 
have been repaired by the replacement of a part thereof, the taxpayer will have to show 
that the part required replacement because of decay, wear or deterioration or damage, 
whether in the ordinary course or through the elements ... "24 . 
15 ITC 1264 (1977) 39 SATC 133 at 133 
16 (1941) 13 SATC 77 
17 (1944) SATC 485 
18 (1977) 39 SATC 133 
19 ITC 1264 (1977) 39 SATC 133 at 136 
20 (1941) 13 SATC 77 
21 (1944) 13 SATC 485 
22 (1977) 39 SATC 133 
23 (1977) 39 SATC 133 
24 ITC 1964 39 SATC 133 at 136 
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Thus clearly this is an objective test. It is i1:_i::elevant what the taxpayer's state of mind 
was at the time the repairs were undertaken. 
A further dimension to the word 11 repair11 is provided by the Appellate Division case of 
Flemming v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste25 . The taxpayer was the 
usufructuary of a farm on which there was an existing borehole with a windmill to 
provide water for farming activities. As a result of a decrease in the volume of water 
supplied by the existing borehole, the taxpayer sunk a new borehole and erected a new 
windmill on the farm to ensure there was sufficient water for the cattle farming 
activities on the farm. After the Commissioner for Inland Revenue disallowed the 
deduction of the expenses incurred in constructing the new borehole and windmill and 
the taxpayer's appeal to the Special Court had failed, the taxpayer appealed to the 
Appellate Division. Counsel contended on the taxpayer's behalf 11 ••• dat die plaas 
Leeuboscb 'n kapitaalstruktuur is. Voortbouend hierop bet by beweer dat die 
grondliggende beginsel tot art ll(d) is dat 'n belastingpligte geregtig sou wees om 
die verdienvermoe van 'n kapitaalstruktuur in stand te bou tot die mate wat 
laasgenoemede gehad bet toe dit oorspronklik deur die belastingpligtige verkry 
is. Waar daardie verdienvermoe egter met tydsverloop verswak of verklein bet, 
soos in die onderbawige geval met die eerste boorgat se watervoorsiening, 
beboort 'n belastingpligtige geregtig te wees kragtens art ll(d) op 'n aftrekking 
van sodanige uitgawes wat nodig is om die verdienvermoe te berstel of te behou 
25 57 SATC 73, 1995 (1) SATC 574 (A) 
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wat die kapitaalstruktuur gebad bet toe die belastingpligtige sy of baar regte ten 
opsigte daarvan verkry bet". 26 
In other words, it was contended that the fundamental principle of Section 11 ( d) was 
that the earning capacity of a capital structure could be maintained in the condition it 
was originally acquired by the taxpayer. 27 Thus the taxpayer could deduct the costs of 
repairing the income capacity of her farm by repairing the water supply. ("Op bierdie 
basis sou Mev Flemming uit boofte van ll(d) geregtig wees op die aftrekking van 
die onkoste van RlO 447.00 weens die berstel van die verdiens vermoe van die 
plaas Leeuboscb deur die berstel van sy watervoorsiening"). 28 
Joubert JA clarified the issue by stating that "art ll(d) nie regstreeks gemoeid is met 
onkoste wat vir die berstel van die verdienvermoe van 'n eiendom deur 'n 
belastingpligtige aangegaan is nie. Artikel ll(d) bet betrekking op onkoste wat 
aan die berstel van die eiendom self bestee is" (my emphasis). 29 
Thus, in order for expenditure to be deductible as a repair, it is imperative that the 
property itself is repaired. In this case the initial borehole and windmill were not 
repaired as the physical state was unaltered - a further borehole and windmill were 
constructed instead. 
26 Flemming van Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1995(1) SA 574 at 583 C-D 
27 Flemming v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1995(1) SA 574 at 576 
28 Felmming v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1995(1) SA 574 at 583E) 
29 Flemming v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1995(1) SA 574 at 583F) 
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While the above is the approach of the courts to the meaning of the word "repair" 
generally, when determining what expenditure falls within the ambit of Section 11 ( d), 
our law has further distilled the meaning of repairs by elucidating "useful principles"30 
as to what constitutes a repair in the context of Section 1 l(d). These are contained in 
the oft cited case ofITC 61 ?31 
Here the court reviewed the numerous authorities and summarised the principles 
relating to repairs as follows32. 
"(1) Repair is restoration by renewal or replacement of subsidiary parts 
of the whole. Renewal as distinguished from repair is 
reconstruction of the entirety, meaning by the entirety not 
necessarily the whole but substantially the whole subject matter 
under discussion. 
(2) In the case of repairs effected by renewal it is not necessary that 
the materials used should be identical with the materials replaced. 
(3) Repairs are to be distinguished from improvements. The test for 
this purpose is - has a new asset been created resulting in an 
increase in the income-earning capacity or does the work 
undertaken merely represent the cost of restoring the asset to a 
state in which it will continue to earn income as before?33" 
30 Silke on South African Income Tax Volume II, 1989 edited by A de Koker at paragraph 8.91A 
31 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
32 Meyerowitz: Meyerowitz on Income Tax (1995) at 12.7 
33 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 476 
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Each of the above essential elements of a repair will be analysed below. 
(3) REPAIR VS RENEWAL 
As indicated above, repairs are deductible in terms of Section 11 ( d) while 
renewals are not. It is thus vital that repairs are distinguished from renewals. 
Silke suggests that "the distinction between repairs and renewals was clearly 
brought out in the case of Rhodesia Railways Ltd vs Collector of Income Tax, 
Bechuanaland34 
In this case the taxpayer owned a railway line. As the track was generally worn 
and in a dangerous state, the taxpayer embarked on an extensive programme of 
renewal which went beyond normal maintenance. New sleepers, rails and 
fastening were laid over part of the track. The result of the renewals was to 
restore the track to its normal condition, capable of giving the same service as 
before35 . The Collector of Income Tax, Bechuanaland disallowed the 
deduction in assessing the profits arising in Bechuanaland, on the grounds that 
the expenditure was not a "repair" as envisaged in a provision equivalent to 
Section 11 ( d) but constituted a reconstruction of the line and was therefore of 
a capital nature". 36 
34 (1933) AC 368 16 SATC 225) as in Silke on South African Income Tax (edited by A. de Koker, 
Volume 11, 1989 at 8.94) 
35 Silke on South African Income Tax (edited by A. de Koker, Volume 11, 1989 at 8.94) and Emslie 
et al: Income Tax Cases and Materials (1995) p 662 
36 Silke on South African Income Tax (edited by A. de Koker ,Volume 11, 1989 paragraph 8.94 and 
Emslie et al: Income Tax Cases and Materials (1995) p 662 
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The taxpayer's objection to the disallowance of the deduction was overruled 
and its appeal to the Special Court was dismissed, thus the taxpayer appealed 
to the Privy Council37 
Lord MacMillan (with Lord Askin and Lord Russell of Killowen concurring) 
cited the judgment of Lurcott v Wakely and Wheeler38 where Lord Justice 
Buckley (as he then was) stated that "repair" and "renew" are not words 
expressive of a clear contrast and at 924: "Repair is restoration by renewal or 
replacement of subsidiary part of a whole. Renewal, as distinguished from 
repair, is reconstruction of the entirety, meaning by the entirety not necessarily 
the whole but substantially the whole subject matter under discussion"39 
Turning to the facts, the Privy Council stated that "the periodical renewal by 
sections of the rails and sleepers of a railway line as they wear out by use is in 
no sense a reconstruction of the whole railway and is an ordinary incident of 
railway administration. The fact that the wear, although continuous, is not, and 
cannot be, made good annually does not render the work a renewal, when it 
comes to be effected, necessarily a capital charge. The expenditure here in 
question was incurred in consequence of the rails having been worn out in 
earning the income of previous years, on which tax had been paid without 
37 .Emslie et al: Income Tax Cases and Materials (1995) p 662 
38 (1911) 1 KB 905 at 923 
39 Rhodesia Railways Ltd v Collector oflncome Tax. Bechunanaland 6 SATC 225 at 229 
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deduction in respect of such wear, and represented the cost of restoring them 
to a state in which they could continue to earn income". 40 
Thus the expenditure constituted a repair as the taxpayer replaced sleepers, 
railways and fastenings which were subsidiary to the railway as a whole and the 
expenditure was thus deductible. 
A further case which distinguishes repairs from renewal is that of ITC 63741 . 
Here the taxpayer owned a large building which was used for the purpose of 
cold storage. It consisted of a basement, ground floor and first floor. The 
chemicals used for the purpose of refrigeration damaged the interior of the 
building and dry rot had set in. The building had deteriorated to such an extent 
that it was dangerous and the municipal authorities condemned it for use for 
cold storage purposes. The taxpayer therefore undertook a scheme of 
reconstruction42. The wooden floors and pillars were replaced, partitions, 
insulating materials and electrical fittings were removed. Thus the building was 
left merely a brick shell. Thereafter, the building was reconstructed by laying 
concrete floors in lieu of wood and replacing wooden pillars with concrete 
pillars43 . "As a result a strong and substantial building took the place of the 
rotten and dangerous structure which had existed previously"44 . 
40 Rhodesia Railways Ltd v Collector oflncome Tax, Bechunanaland (1933) 6 SATC 225 at 229 in 
Emslie: Income Tax Cases and Materials (1995) p662 
41 (1947) 15 SATC 126 
42 ITC 637 (1947) 15 SATC 126 at 127 to 128 
43 ITC 637 (1947) 15 SATC 126 at 128 
44 ITC 637 (1947) 15 SATC 126 at 128 
- 11 -
When the Commissioner refused to allow the deduction of the above expenses 
as a repair, the taxpayer appealed to the Special Court. 
Referring to the judgment of African Products Manufacturing Company 
Limited45, and quoting from the ratio of Lurcott v Wakely and Wheeler46, 
C J Ingram KC stated that "the question of repair is in every case one of 
degree, and the test is whether the act to be done is one which in substance is 
the renewal or replacement of defective parts or replacement of substantially 
the whole"47. 
Turning to the facts, the learned judge stated that "the substantial question that 
arises is has there been if not a reconstruction of the entirety i.e. the whole of 
the subject matter, then at least of substantially the whole subject matter under 
discussion. The Court is of the opinion that the question must be answered in 
the affirmative. 1148 Explaining this decision, CJ Ingram KC stated that "after 
the demolition only the old skeleton of the building remained . . . ( t )he whole of 
the interior was rebuilt from floor to floor. It was reconstruction if not of the 
whole, of substantially the whole of the subject matter under discussion .... It is 
clear from the evidence that the time had long passed when the building was 
capable of repair. The interior had to be reconstructed from floor to ceiling. In 
the case of buildings needing repair the owner may elect to adopt one of two 
alternatives. He may repair the building from time to time, or he may let the 
45 (1944) TPD 13 SATC 164 
46 (1911) 1 KB 905 
47 ITC 637 (1947) 15 SATC 126 at 129 
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building deteriorate till it is no longer usable and then set about a scheme of 
reconstruction. This latter course, whether forced upon it by circumstance or 
otherwise, the appellant company adopted. It did not repair and as a result it 
was forced to reconstruct the building practically in its entirety. "49 
Thus both the cases of ITC 63 750 and African Products Manufacturing 
Company Limited51 clearly illustrate that in order for a replacement or renewal 
to be regarded as a repair, the subject matter which is repaired must be 
subsidiary to the whole. Whether this is the case or not is often a question of 
degree. Furthermore, ITC 63?52 raises an issue which was raised in ITC 23853 . 
In ITC 23854, the taxpayer had for many years carried on business in premises 
owned by them. For at least ten years, the taxpayers only effected those repairs 
to the premises that could not be delayed, with the result that the building was 
very dilapidated. 55 When the local authority raised the matter, the taxpayer 
decided to embark on a large scheme of reconstruction56 and at the same time 
to modernise and improve the premises57 
48 ITC 637 (1947) 15 SATC 126 at 129 
49 ITC 637 (1947) 15 SATC 126 at 129 - 130 
50 (1947) 15 S.ATC 126 
51 1944 TPD 13 SATC 164 
52 (1947) 15 SATC 126 
53 (1932) 6 SATC 353 (1932) 
54 (1932) 6 SATC 353 
55 ITC 238 (1932) 6 SATC 353 
56 ITC 238 (1932) 6 SATC 535 as in Emslie et al: Income Tax Cases and Materials (1995) p 667 
57 ITC 238 (1932) 6 SATC 535 at 535 
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Dr Manfred Nathan KC in his judgment stated that "the real question which 
,,,,,. 
arises in this case is whether the repairs which have been delayed for such a 
long period are to be considered as ordinary repairs, or whether the injury 
which had resulted to the building occupied by the (taxpayers) became so great 
that instead of it being necessary to effect mere ordinary repairs, the result was 
that what virtually amounted to structural alterations had to be taken to hand. 
The consequence, in the latter case, would be that it would be capital 
expenditure and not properly chargeable against the trading income of the 
( taxpayers )58". The learned judge found that "... on the very fair and candid 
evidence which was given by the witnesses for the applicant in this matter, it 
appears abundantly clear to us that this was in fact a reconstruction. There had 
been originally the intention to effect repairs, but what they embarked upon, 
according to the plans and contract, was something entirely new. They 
incorporated a great deal which was not there before, with the very laudable 
object of modernising these particular business premises 11 59 . 
Thus both ITC 63760 and ITC 23861 address an issue which is vital with regard 
to the timing of repairs .. As ITC 63 762 crisply states, a taxpayer "may repair the 
building from time to time, or he may let the building deteriorate till it is no 
longer usable and then set about a scheme of reconstruction. "63 Clearly in both 
of the abovementioned cases, the taxpayer chose the latter option, he did not 
58 ITC 238 (1932) 6 SATC 535 at 535 
59 ITC 238 (1932) 6 SATC 535 at 353 and 356. 
60 (1947) 15 SATC 126 
61 (1932) 6 SATC 353 
62 (1947) 15 SATC 126 
63 ITC 637 (1947) 15 SATC 126 
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repair his buildings regularly rather he allowed his building to deteriorate to 
such an extent that replacing or renewing the worn out parts was on such a 
scale that the whole or substantially the whole of the subject matter is replaced 
or renewed, rendering the expenditure a renewal rather than a repair. 
However, had the taxpayer replaced or renewed those parts of the building 
which required attention regularly, the cost of such expenditure would probably 
have been deductible as repairs. 
Thus clearly a taxpayer should rather repair or renew regularly to avoid his 
expenditure being on such a large scale that the deduction of such expenditure 
is disallowed as a renewal. 
It is interesting to speculate whether the outcome of the above two cases 
would have been any different had the taxpayer, realising that his building 
required an overhaul decided to effect the repairs gradually, say over a few 
years of assessment. In both cases this course of conduct was not possible as 
the municipalities were bringing pressure to bear on the taxpayers to remedy 
the seriously dilapidated buildings. However, had the option of gradually 
repairing his building been available and had the taxpayers availed themselves 
of this opportunity, it is my contention that the outcome would have been 
favourable for the taxpayer. Such renewals or replacements would have been 
to the subsidiary of the whole and would thus not have been a renewal but 
rather a repair. 
- 15 -
Thus it is in the taxpayer's interests to time his repairs correctly, not to let his 
building deteriorate to the extent that a renewal is necessary and if such 
deterioration has occurred, if possible, to gradually correct the building thus 
ensuring that the expenditure would constitute a repair rather than a renewal. 
A further issue which has been glossed over until now but which in the context 
/ 
of a distinction between repairs and renewals requires further consideration is 
the meaning of the term "the entirety". ITC 61764 states that "renewal as 
distinguished from repair is reconstruction of the entirety, meaning by the 
entirety not necessarily the whole but substantially the whole subject matter 
under discussion "65 . In other words in order to determine whether the 
replacement or renewal of a subsidiary part of a whole or the entirety has 
occurred, it is vital to determine what constitutes the entirety. 
This issue was addressed in ITC 70966 . The taxpayer was a miller. In order to 
power his mill, he removed water from a river and lead it by means of a mile 
long furrow to his mill where it was used to drive a turbine. To get the water 
from the river, a weir had been constructed, raising its level. 67 After the weir 
was damaged by flood, work was undertaken to enable the weir to continue 
performing its function of raising the level of the river to deliver water into the 
64 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
65 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 476 
66 (1950) 17 SATC 227 
67 ITC 709 (1950) 17 SATC 227 at 227 
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furrow. The work performed raised the level of the weir and caused certain 
other changes in the structure including the incorporation of a sluice gate. 
After the taxpayer's objection to the disallowance of the deduction of the 
£440.00 cost of the work was dismissed, he appealed to the Special Court68 . 
Mr Robertson on behalf of the taxpayer contended 
"(a) that the weir was a vital and integral portion of the plant and 
machinery, this plant and machinery consisted of the weir, the water 
furrow and the turbine and the amount of £440. 00 had been 
expended in repairing a portion only of this machinery; 
(b) the whole of the weir had not been washed away inasmuch as the 
platform of the weir remained undamaged and only those portions of 
the weir above the platform, viz. the loose stones and the wall, had 
been damaged and required to be replaced. "69 
Thus Mr Robertson was attempting to bring the expenditure within the 
boundaries of the equivalent of Section 1 l(d) by alleging that such expenditure 
was with regard to "a portion only of the property or machinery necessary for 
the supply of motive power used for the purpose of manufacturing the products 
of his trade". 70 
68 ITC 709 (1950) 17 SATC 227 at 228 
69 ITC 709 (1950) 17 SATC 227 at 228 
70 ITC 709 (1950)17 SATC 227 at 229 
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The Commissioner contended that the taxpayer had "reconstructed 
substantially the whole of a permanent structure"71 . 
Herbstein J then considered the meaning of the concept of "the entirety" and 
stated that "the instant case has presented many difficulties, the first of which is 
the determination of the "entirety". Must the appellant's undertaking - weir, 
furrow and factory - be looked upon as an integral whole? Or must the weir be 
looked upon as a separate entity and as the "entirety"? If it is, was what 
applicant did "the reconstruction of the entirety?"72 
The court held that the taxpayer's "undertaking should be viewed as a whole ... 
That the weir and factory were separated (and, incidentally, connected with one 
another) by a furrow of a mile in length, does not, in the Court's view, lead to a 
contrary conclusion. For the length of the furrow does not serve to create 
three "entireties"; the weir, the furrow (whatever its length) and the factory are 
but part of one whole enterprise and each is essential to the production of 
appellant's income: each of them is valueless to the taxpayer without the 
other. 1173 The Court then held that since only the weir had been damaged, the 
replacement or renewal was not to substantially the whole of the subject matter 
and was thus deductible as a repair. 74 
71 ITC 709 (1950)17 SATC 227 at 230. 
72 ITC 709 (1950) 17 SATC 227 at 230 
73 ITC 709 (1950) 17 SATC 227 at 231 
74 ITC 709 (1950)17 SATC 227 at 231. 
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Thus in determining what should be regarded as the entirety, the Court 
considered the issue from the perspective of what constitutes the enterprise of 
the miller. The weir, furrow and factory were all part of the same enterprise 
and each' of them were "valueless" to the taxpayer without the others. 75 The 
physical distance between the weir and the factory - a mile in length - was not 
considered to be important. Thus the approach which ITC 70976 seems to 
endorse is to regard the enterprise as the entirety. 
In the seminal decision ofITC 61777, CJ Ingram KC turned his attention to the 
question of how one determines the "entirety". In this case, the taxpayer was a 
horse-racing club.78 It sought to deduct various items of expenditure incurred 
by it during the 1944 and 1945 tax year79 such as replacing starting gates, 
fencing and a stand. 
After stipulating the oft quoted abovementioned principles to determine 
whether an expense constitutes a repair80, the learned judge turned to the facts 
and stated that "in the case at hand, the taxpayer's business was sui generis and 
for the purpose of applying the above principles to the particular items of 
expenditure of which it is claimed should be deductible it is necessary to have 
75 ITC 709 (1950) 17 SATC 227 at 230 
76 (1950) 17 SATC 227 
77 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
78 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 474 
79 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
80 As quoted on page 7 above 
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regard to the undertaking itself'. 81 Thus CJ Ingram KC seems also to consider 
the taxpayer's enterprise as a relevant factor. The learned judge continued by 
stating that "in the case of an ordinary building ascertainment of the whole 
subject matter does not present any particular difficulty. A racecourse, 
however, embraces several distinct units which may be regarded as essential to 
the carrying on of the business, and consists of buildings such as stands, 
totalisators, stables, refreshment rooms, etc.; and the course proper, to which 
the rails are appurtenant, as also starting gates and so on. Further the property, 
as a whole, requires to be fenced for the purpose of excluding persons who 
have no right of admission 11 82 . 
The learned judge continued to state that "(i)n the case of such an undertaking 
in the opinion of the Court, as far as the buildings are concerned, the general 
principles applicable to the repair of each building as constituting a separate 
and distinct subject matter, are applicable to that particular building, whether 
used for one purpose, or jointly for several purposes. In the case of the race 
track of course itself the whole subject matter is to be regarded as comprising 
the track itself, the rails along it and the starting gates, discs indicating distance 
and so on. 
81 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC at 476 
82 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 476 
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As regards the fencing around the course, this is not a separate subject matter 
but is a subsidiary part of the race course"83 . 
C.J. Ingram KC then proceeded to address each item of expenditure claimed by 
the taxpayer84 . 
The above approach of the learned judge to the question of what constitutes 
the "entirety" for the purpose of determining whether expenditure constitutes a 
repair or renewal is most enlightening. Firstly, he pointed out that" (i)n the 
case of an ordinary building, the ascertainment of the whole subject matter does 
not present any difficulty"85 . Presumably, C.J. Ingram KC is suggesting that 
where a building is repaired, the building will constitute the entirety. It is my 
belief that where the reconstruction undertaken is similar to that in ITC 63 786 
and ITC 23887 - major overhauls of entire buildings - it is not difficult to agree 
that the building constitutes the entirety or whole of the subject matter. 
Furthermore this seems to be the approach adopted by many cases ( such as 
ITC 1408)88 . Thus where repairs are effected to a building, the approach 
seems to be to consider the building itself as the subject matter. 
83 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 477 
84 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 478 to 480 
85 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 476 
86 (1947) 15 SATC 126 
87 (1932) 6 SATC 353 
88 (1985) 48 SATC 21 
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Secondly, the learned judge does take cognisance of the enterprise carried on 
by the taxpayer stating that it is "necessary to have regard to the undertaking 
itself1' 89. However, unlike the court in the abovementioned ITC 70990 which 
determined what constituted the entirety by determining what are "part of the 
whole enterprise"91 and essential to the taxpayer's income, in other words 
where the enterprise constituted. the entirety. in ITC 617 the enterprise of a 
taxpayer seems to play a lesser role. In this case, CJ Ingram KC states that "in 
the case of such an undertaking (horse racing course) ... the general principles 
applicable to the repair of each building as constituting a separate and distinct 
subject matter, are applicable to that particular building, whether used for one 
purpose, or cojointly for several purposes. "92 The learned judge considered 
each physical structure separately to evaluate whether the expenditure 
constitute a repair, for example, he considered the native stand as "a separate 
building"93 and the race track as a separate entity "comprising the track itself, 
the rails along it and the starting gate, discs indicating distance and so on". 94 
Thus, CJ Ingram KC regards each separate physical entity as a separate entity 
rather than considering the whole enterprise of the taxpayer as a separate 
subject matter as was the approach in ITC 70995 . The question is, which is the 
decisive approach. 
89 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 476 
90 (1950) 17 SATC 227 
91 ITC 709 (1950) 17 SATC 227 
92 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 477 
93 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 477 
94 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 477 
95 (1950) 17 SATC at 227 
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This issue was addressed by Meyerowitz SC96 . He asks "must the entity be 
regarded as the whole commercial or industrial undertaking or must it be 
regarded as that which physically constitutes the separate building on which the 
work in question has been done? The latter seems to have been the approach 
in most of the decided cases .. .'.n Similarly in ITC 85598 it was observed that 
"a study of the English and Scottish cases discloses that the English courts in 
considering what is the entirety have approached the problem very much as an 
architect or builder would do and have inquired - what physically constitutes 
the building or structure on which the work in question has been done? 
Scottish courts, on the other hand, have adopted more the approach of the 
economist and have inquired - what is the commercial or industrial 
undertaking? It seems to me with respect that the English approach is 
correct". 99 
Thus it seems that the approach in ITC 617100 - to concentrate on the separate 
building rather than the enterprise seems to be the general approach in 
determining what constitutes the "entirety". 
Once one determines what constitutes the subject matter. The final issue to be 
addressed with regard to the distinction between repairs and renewals is when 
is the renewal or replacement subsidiary to the whole so that it constitutes 
96 Meyerowitz: Meyerowitz on Income Tax (1995) at 12.8 
97 Meyerowitz: Meyerowitz on Income Tax (1995) at 12.8 
9
_
8 As quoted by RC. Williams: Income Tax in South African Law and Practice (Butterworths) 1996, 
page 269 
99 Williams: Income Tax in South African Law and Practice (1996) P269 
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repairs and when is the work done to the subject matter a reconstruction of the 
entirety so that it constitutes a renewal? In other words, once one determines 
what constitutes the "whole" how much work can one do to that structure 
before it is no longer a repair but a renewal. 
Meyerowitz SC101 states that the "test as to renewal or replacement of a 
subsidiary part of the entirety is a quantitative one and not always easy of 
application" 102. In other words, one must consider what proportion of the 
subject matter was replaced or renewed. 
This issue is addressed comprehensively in a case we have visited before, that 
ofITC 1264103 where the taxpayer changed his existing drainage system at the 
instance of the municipality only to discover that his drainage system was in 1 
any event in need of repair. In considering whether the work constituted a 
repair or renewal, Grosskopf J stated that "the property in respect of which the 
work was done was the hotel premises, consisting of the land and buildings 
mentioned earlier. The drainage system is an adjunct to the premises - it can 
have no useful existence otherwise than to serve the premises for whose benefit 
it was constructed and of which it forms a part. And although the drainage 
system forms an indispensable function, it is not a major part of the property in 
terms of size or, which is more important, of value. The cost of replacing the 
drainage system was R400.00 representing less than 10% of the total 
100 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
101 Meyerowitz: Meyeowitz on Income Tax (1995) par 12.8 
102 Meyerowitz: Meyeowitz on Income Tax (1995) par 12.8 
- 24 -
expenditure for the year, and only a fraction of the value of the property. In my 
view the drainage system forms only a subsidiary part of the property as a 
whole, and its replacement is prima facie a "repair" in terms of the first prnciple 
in the passage from the judgment in ITC 617 quoted above". 104 
Thus the learned judge based his determination of whether the repair 1s 
subsidiary to the whole on the size of the replaced item and, on what he 
regarded as more important, its value in relation to the total expenditure on the 
whole subject matter and the value of the entire subject matter. He regarded 
the fact that the replacement of the drainage system was less than 10% of the 
value of the expenditure for the year as a sufficiently small amount for the 
expenditure to constitute a subsidiary of the whole and thus a repair. 
A similar approach seems to have been followed by the court in B v 
Commissioner of Taxes, Southern Rhodesia105 . Here the taxpayer, a medical 
practitioner bought a building for £3 400.00 in partnership to use as consulting 
rooms. 1'°6 In 1953 the premises were examined by an architect revealing that 
there were cracks in the wall, the flooring was ant-eaten and the roof beams 
required replacing107. The taxpayer ascertained that the cost of these repairs 
would be considerable and he decided that he would not only effect repairs but 
· also make additions to the existing building. The cost of the additions and 
103 (1977) 39 SATC 133 
104 ITC 1264 (1977) 39 SATC 133 at 136 to 137 
105 19 SATC 353 
106 B v Commissioner of Taxes, Southern Rhodesia 19 SATC 353 at 353 
107 B v Commissioner of Taxes, Southern Rhodesia 19 SATC 353 at 354 
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alterations came to £ 12 184. 00 and the taxpayer alleged that £2 000. 00 
constituted repairs to the existing building108 . The Commissioner of Taxes, 
however, contended that all the work was reconstruction and was thus not 
deductible 1°9. 
Quoting the ratio from Lurcott v Wakely and Wheeler110 which was approved 
by Rhodesia Railway v Income Tax Collector of Bechuanaland111, Beadle J 
stated that the approach to be taken to this case is to determine whether the 
operation undertaken by the taxpayer, so far as it affected the old building, 
constitutes a reconstruction of substantially the whole of the existing 
building112. Addressing this issue, the learned judge stated that "(i)t will be 
seen so far as this particular point is involved the issue is purely one of fact, and 
to a very large extent one of degree" 113 . As Silke points out114, the fact that the 
distinction between repairs and renewals is a matter of degree "has been 
emphasised in many decisions" 115 . Beadle J continued by saying that it order to 
appreciate the extent of the alterations made to the existing building, it was 
necessary to compare the plans of the building before and after the work was 
undertaken 116. · The comparison revealed that half the existing walls were 
demolished and rebuilt. Furthermore, many doors and windows were rebuilt in 
108 B v Commissioner of Taxes, Southern Rhodesia 19 SATC 353 at 354 
109 B v Commissioner of Taxes, Southern Rhodesia 19 SATC 353 at 354 
110 [1911] (1) KB 905 
Ill (1933) AC 368 
112 B v Commissioner of Taxes. Southern Rhodesia 19 SATC 353 at 355 
113 Silke on South African Income Tax edited by A. de Koker, Volume II, 1989, 8 - 25 
114 Silke on South African Income Tax edited by A. de Koker, Volume II, 1989, 8 - 29 
115 Silke on South African Income Tax edited by A. de Koker, Volume II, 1989, 8 - 29 
116 B v Commissioner of Taxes, Southern Rhodesia 19 SATC 353 at 355 
- 26 -
different places. Only one ~oom was unchanged117. Furthermore, almost the 
entire roof was removed and 60% of the roof timbers were replaced and further 
beams were added. A large portion of the floor was relaid and the electric 
wiring of the building was completely renewed 118. The learned judge continued 
to say that "(s)ome idea of the magnitude of the alterations that had been 
effected can be gained by some comparison of the relative costs . . . The 
probabilities seem to me to be that ... it would have been almost as cheap if not 
quite as cheap, to have pulled down the whole building and to have 
reconstructed the building exactly to the same design as it is now119. Beadle J 
concluded that "viewing this undertaking as a whole, ... I am satisfied that what 
has been undertaken did involve a reconstruction of substantially the whole of 
the building." 120 
Thus, as mentioned above, the distinction between a repair and a renewal, 
between reconstruction of a subsidiary part of the subject matter as opposed to 
the entirety, is one of degree. 
The distinction between repairs and renewals is, however, not always easy to 
determine. RC. Williams states that "the difficulty with this approach is that it 
merely exchanges one enquiry - was the work a "repair" or "renewal" - for 
another namely does the work relate to a subsidiary part of the whole? The 
117 B v Commissioner of Taxes. Southern Rhodesia 19 SATC 353 at 355 
118 B v Commissioner of Taxes. Southern Rhodesia 19 SATC 353 at 356 
119 B v Commissioner of Taxes. Southern Rhodesia 19 SATC 353 at 356 
120 B v Commissioner of Taxes. Southern Rhodesia 19 SATC 353 at 357 
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latter question is no easier than the former and the cases give very little 
guidance." 121 
I believe that Mr Williams, with respect, is not entirely correct. While it is 
often difficult to determine whether the magnitude of the renewal or 
replacement renders the expenditure a repair, it does seem that the courts do 
provide us with some help by suggesting that one adopt a qualitative approach 
and determine what constitutes the entirety that is being renewed or replaced 
and whether the work done to the whole is a repair or reconstruction in terms 
of its relative size and value. It is this approach that I believe a taxpayer should 
adopt to the distinction between renewals and repair. 
While the taxpayer must be mindful not to allow his expenditure to constitute a 
reconstruction, in terms of the principles elucidated by ITC 617122, the taxpayer 
must also be vigilant to ensure his work does not constitute an improvement. 
(4) REPAIR VS IMPROVEMENT 
In the abovementioned decision of ITC 61 ?123, C.J. Ingram KC, in clarifying 
the principles that relate to repairs, states that: 
121 RC Williams: Income Tax in South African Law and Practice (1990) page 297 
122 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
123 ITC 617 (1944) 14 SATC 474 at 476 
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"Repairs are to be distinguished from improvements. The tests for this purpose 
is - has a new asset been created resulting in an increase in the income-earning 
capacity or does the work undertaken merely represent the cost of restoring the 
asset to a state in which it will continue to earn income as before?" 124 
As with the distinction between repairs and reconstruction, it is vital that one 
distinguish between renewals or replacement that constitute repairs and those 
which constitute improvement to the property. The distinction seems clear - if 
the income earning capacity is increased, the work done constitutes an 
improvement. While it is often not difficult to determine whether or not this is 
the case, there are instances where this distinction is unclear. 
ITC 61 ?125 provides clear examples of repairs. As mentioned above, the 
Cit 
taxpayer in this case was a horse racing club which sought to deduct various 
renewals and repairs it had undertaken. Part of the expenditure the taxpayer 
attempted to deduct was the cost of filling in a dip in the race course126 . The 
course found that this constituted "an improvement for the purpose of levelling 
the course and to do away with the natural dip which had· existed 
previously" 127. Similarly, the court found that the cost of re-grading the course 
"consisted of raising the outside of the course and altering the camber at the 
124 ITC 617 14 SATC 474 at 476 
125 (1944) 14 SATC 474 at 476 
126 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 474 
127 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 477 to 478 
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bends so as to enable the horses to negotiate them more easily. It is an 
improvement and does not constitute repairs" .128 
It is not difficult in the above two examples to conclude that the taxpayer had 
increased the income earning capacity of his assets by creating a race track 
which is superior to that which existed before and thus such expenditure 
constitutes an improvement. However, in more complex examples, it is 
important to come to grips with the concept of an improvement. As set out in 
the above quote from ITC 61 ?129, two concepts need to be explained in order 
to fully grasp the distinction between repairs and improvements. These are 
incoming earning capacities and the original conditions of the subject matter. If 
the renewal or replacement results in there being no increase in earning 
capacity, the expenditure constitutes a repair. One thus requires an 
understanding of what constitutes the income-earning capacity of a property. 
Furthermore, in order to determine whether the income earning capacity has 
increased, it is obviously essential to determine what was the original condition 
of the property or machine. 
A. INCOME EARNING CAPACITY 
A case which addresses the concept of income earning capacity is that of ITC 
915 130. In this case the taxpayer owned a cqmmercial property which had a 
128 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474 at 478 
129 14 SATC 474 
130 (1960) 24 SATC 219 
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lean-to corregated iron roof which leaked. On the recommendation of an 
architect it was decided to reuse iron from the roof but to change the lean-to 
structure to a rigid roof. It was also necessary to replace certain purlins which 
had split. The change in the roofs shape requires new roof trusses, additional 
iron sheeting, ridging and piping as well as substantial other consequential 
expenditure 131 . 
In addressing the issue of whether this constitutes a repair, J.C.R. Fieldsend 
stated that "(t)here are a variety of cases in which the distinction between 
repairs and improvements have been discussed, but the principle that emerges 
from them seems to be succinctly summed up in Blann's Principles of South 
African Income Tax, paragraph 114, page 131, as follows: 'if a building has 
been altered or added to or improved in form, character or durability, even if 
the premises are thereby rendered more suitable, convenient or attractive and 
thus productive of increased revenue, the cost thereof is not admissible as a 
"repair"; such expenditure increases the capital value of the asset and ranks as 
expenditure of a capital nature" 11132 . 
"In short, the "taxpayer" has to establish that the work that was done for the 
purpose of restoring the roof to its original condition and not for the purpose 
of improving the form, character or durability of the building. It is clear to me 
131 ITC 915 (1960) 24 SATC 219 
132 ITC 915 {1960) 24 SATC 220 
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that the evidence does not establish this. The roof as replaced was of a better 
design and more durable and added to the value of the building as a whole" 133 . 
The above description clearly illustrates the test for increased earning capacity. 
It appears to be relatively widely defined. The premises need only be rendered 
more attractive, convenient, suitable, durable or be improved in form or 
character so that the revenue producing capacity increases, for the expenditure 
to constitute an increase in the income-earning capacity and thus an 
improvement. If one applies the above test to the facts of ITC 61 7134, it is clear 
that the levelling and regrading of the race track would have improved the form 
of the race track making it more suitable for racing thus increasing its income 
earning capacity. Thus the decision can be explained in terms of the test 
provided by ITC 915 135 
While a renewal or replacement will not constitute an improvement if the 
income earning capacity has not increased, it is important to bear in mind that 
such expenditure will only constitute a repair if it complies with the other 
requirements of a repair. In Flemming vs Kommissaris van Binnelandse 
Inkomste136 mentioned above, the taxpayer sunk a new borehole and erected a 
new windmill as the volume of water supplied by the existing borehole and 
windmill had decreased 137. 
133 ITC 915 24 SATC 220 
134 ITC 1408 (1984) 48 SATC 21 at 25 
135 ITC 915 (1960) 24 SATC 220 
136 57 SATC 73 1995 (1) SAT 574 (A) 
137 Flemming v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1995(1) SA 574(A) at 576 
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The taxpayer claimed that the principle of Section 11 ( d) is that the taxpayer can 
maintain the income earning capacity of a capital structure. Thus where the 
income earning capacity has decreased as a result of a reduction in the water 
supply of the original borehole, the taxpayer can repair the income earning 
capacity by erecting a new borehole and windmill138 . Joubert JA held that 
Section 11 ( d) is not concerned with expenditure to repair the income earning 
capacity of a property but rather with the costs that relate to the repair of the 
property itself39. Thus while the income earning capacity has not increased, 
the existing borehole was not repaired so that the expenditure in constructing a 
new borehole could not constitute a repair. 
B. ORIGINAL CONDITION 
As mentioned above, in order to determine whether the income earnmg 
capacity of any property has been increased, one clearly must be able to 
determine the original condition of the property in order to make the 
comparison between the income earning capacity before and after the renewal 
or replacement. This issue is · particularly complex when the deterioration 
occurred before the taxpayer acquired the asset - pre-acquisition deterioration. 
The issue alluded to here is the legal position where a property is acquired in a 
state of disrepair. As David Clegg states140 "does renewal mean renewal to the 
138 Flemming v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1995(1) SA 574(A) at 583 C-D 
139 Flemming v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1995(1) SA 574(A) at 583F 
14° Clegg: "Repairs and Pre-Acquisition Deterioration" 1995 5 Tax Planning 29 at 30 
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original condition when the building was new or to the <:riginal condition when 
acquired.by the taxpayer?" 141 Clearly if the answer to the above question is the 
latter, when the asset is acquired by the taxpayer, then when restoring the asset 
to the condition it was when first created would usually constitute an 
improvement as the income earning capacity of the asset would in all likelihood 
have increased. If the original condition means the conditions of the asset 
when new, restoring the asset to this condition would not constitute an 
improvement. 
Mr Clegg refers to ITC 203 142 where the taxpayer had acquired a complex of 
shops in a poor state of repair and performed substantial work to ensure that 
they all had an appearance similar to certain new shops acquired by him. The 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue contended that sums incurred for the 
purpose of repair are not deductible in the case of repairs to newly acquired 
property. This assertion was based on the leading United Kingdom case on this 
issue - Law Shipping Co vs CIR 1923 22 TC 621 143 . In the Law Shipping 
case, it was found that even where a ship had been operated on an initial 
voyage by its new owners before necessary repairs were carried out, those 
repairs were in fact part of the cost of acquisition of the vessel, of a capital 
nature and not deductible144. 
141 Clegg: "Repairs and Pre-Acquisition Deterioration" 1995 5 Tax Planning 29 at 30 
142 (1931) 6 SATC 34 
143 Clegg: Repairs and Pre-Acquisition Deterioration 1995 5 Tax Planning 29 at 30 
144 Clegg: Repairs and Pre-Acquisition Deterioration 1995 5 Tax Planning 29 at 30 
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Dr Manfred Nathan in ITC 203 145 pointed out that the Law Shipping case was 
determined under an entirely different statute but decided the case on the basis 
that the work undertaken by the taxpayer was a substantial reconstruction146. 
Clegg then refers to ITC 1408147. In this case, the taxpayer purchased land and 
constructed a building on it. The taxpayer observed a deterioration in the brick 
facade of the building. When this worsened, he consulted an architect and civil 
engineer. They advised that the facade had become so insecure, dangerous and 
defective that it should be demolished and replaced with a structurally safe 
cladding148. Thus the entire facade was removed and replaced by pre-cast 
concrete panels. 
The Commissioner contended that what had been effected was not a repair but 
an improvement falling outside the scope of Section 11 ( d). 
Nestadt J summarised the law in the following fashion: " the principle is that 
where something that was not previously there is added to the subject matter, 
this will not usually be a repair but rather an improvement . . . Where, however, 
something which is already in place is found to be in a state of disrepair and 
requires replacement, the latter will normally be categorised as a repair" 149. 
145 (1931) 6 SATC 34 
146 Clegg: Repairs and Pre-Acquisition Deterioration 1995 5 Tax Planning 29 at 29 
147 (1985) 48 SATC 21 
148 ITC 1408 (1985) 48 SATC 21 
149 ITC 1408 (1985) 48 SATC 21 at 25 as in Clegg page 30 
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He continued to state that he could "see no reason for holding that work which 
is directed to putting right a defect which existed when a building was first 
completed cannot qualify as a repair . . . The condition of a building may be (i) 
sound, or (ii) inherently defective or (iii) actually defective. The work taken to 
rectify (iii) does not fall outside the scope of repair simply because it results in 
the condition of the building being changed to (i) rather than (ii)" 150. The 
learned judge then held that "the work can without doing violence to the 
language of Section 11 ( d) be accommodated under the concept of repair. 151 
The above quotation seems to solve the question posed by Mr Clegg as well as 
providing additional insight into the concept of "original condition". 
As Clegg points out, after referring to the above quote "this then is some 
support for the proposition that there is an objective state of good repair which 
may be applied to any building and which does not necessarily equate to the 
condition in which it was when the taxpayer concerned took possession. But 
there is, on the other hand, no direct authority for this view . . . . Having regard 
to all the above, it is my view that repair (restoration) in the context intended 
by Section 11 ( d) involves reinstatement of an asset to its condition as new 
when first constructed. This statement made in ITC 1408 (above), although 
obiter seems to me to be the proper interpretation" 152. 
150 ITC 1408 (1985) 48 SATC 21 at 26 
151 ITC 1408 (1985) 48 SATC 21 at 26 
152 Clegg: Repairs and Pre-Acquisition Deterioration 1995 5 Tax Planning 29 at 30 
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I submit with respect that Clegg's interpretation of ITC 1408153 seems correct. 
This case certainly seems to advocate the position that a taxpayer is entitled to 
restore an asset to its state when first completed. As Clegg himself emphasises, 
Nestadt J states that he found "no reason for holding that work which is 
directed to putting a defect which existed when a building was first completed 
cannot comply as a repair" 154. Thus a taxpayer is probably entitled to repair 
deterioration which had occurred pre-acquisition. In other words, the original 
condition to which a taxpayer is entitled to repair his assets without such 
expenditure constituting an improvement is not the condition of the asset at 
time of purchase but rather at time of completion of the asset. 
The significance of ITC 1408155 is not, however, limited to pre-acquisition 
deterioration. As alluded to by Clegg156, ITC 1408157 seems to suggest that 
there is an objective state of good repair which may be applied to an asset158 . 
In this case, the taxpayer's building was constructed with an inherent defect. 
The taxpayer's expenditure did not return the property to its condition when 
first completed, ( which was with an inherent defect), but in fact left the building 
in a better condition - in a sound condition without the inherent defect. If one 
were to regard the condition of the property at date of completion as the 
original condition, the taxpayer's expenditure removing the inherent defect 
153 (1984) 48 SATC 21 
154 Clegg: Repairs and Pre-Acquisition Deterioration 1995 5 Tax Planning 29 at 30 
155 (1984) 48 SATC 21 
156 Clegg: Repairs and Pre-Acquisition Deterioration 1995 5 Tax Planning 29 at 30 
157 (1984) 48 SATC 21 
158 Clegg: Repairs and Pre-Acquisition Deterioration 1995 5 Tax Planning 29 at 30 
(5) 
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could amount to an improvement. This was indeed contended by the 
Commissioner which claimed that "if one started with a faulty building and then 
rectified it, the inevitable result was an improvement" 159. 
However, as quoted above, the court found that a taxpayer is entitled to repair 
his building to a sound state even if it had been inherently defective160. This 
was alluded to by Clegg161 . 
Thus, to sum up, the "original condition" to which a taxpayer is entitled to 
restore his assets (without such restoration constituting an improvement) is to 
the condition of the asset after it was first completed regardless of when the 
taxpayer acquired the asset. Furthermore, in the situation where the asset was 
initially completed suffering from an inherent defect, the taxpayer is entitled to 
restore the asset to a sound condition and the expenditure may still be deducted 
as a repair. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that expenditure will only be 
regarded as an improvement if it increases the income earning capacity of the 
asset. 
THE MATERIALS USED FOR REPAIR 
The final principle elucidated by ITC 6 I ?162 regarding the deductibility of 
repairs is that "in the case of repairs effected by renewal it is not necessary that 
159 ITC 1408 (1984) 48 SATC 21 at 25 
160 ITC 1408 (1984) 48 SATC 21 at 26 
161 ITC 1408 (1984) 48 SATC 21 at 30 
162 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
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the materials used should be identical to the materials replaced" 163 . The 
taxpayer is free to use materials different to those originally used in the 
deteriorated asset and such expenditure will be deductible as a repair as long as 
the renewal does not constitute an improvement or a reconstruction of the 
whole asset. As Silke puts it, "(a)s long as the purpose of the work is to 
restore the assets to its original condition, as distinct from creating an 
improvement, the work constitutes a repair" 164 
The issue of a change of material was addressed in ITC 520165 . Here the 
taxpayer replaced wooden fences that surrounded a property that he let with 
brick walls. Owing to the dilapidated condition of the fences, the only 
alternative to the erection of a brick wall was the entire replacement of the 
existing fences with new wooden fences. To do so would have been more 
expensive than constructing the brick walls166 . 
Referring to the facts, Dr Manfred Nathan KC stated that "(t)here is nothing 
whatsoever to indicate that brick work of this nature is more permanent than 
the wooden fence was previously . . . The facts as proved disclose that nothing 
-
was added to the property which was not there before, except that a different 
material was used for executing the repairs" 167. 
163 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
164
· Silke on South African Income Tax edited by A. de Koker, Volume II, 1989, 8 - 29 
165 (1942) 13 SATC 404 
166 ITC 520 (1942) 13 SATC 404 at 404 
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The learned judge continued to state that "(i)t appears to us that there must be 
many cases where a repair cannot be effected without new materials and 
without what in effect amounts to a replacement of integral parts of the 
property. To hold that a repair in such a case is a capital addition would mean 
that in no case could repairs be made except from or with original materials" 168. 
Thus the court clearly endorsed the approach that a taxpayer can not be 
prevented from deducting work done as a repair simply because the materials 
used were different to the original materials. Dr Manfred Nathan KC does 
point out that "(i)n the present case there were no improvements" 169 and there 
was no suggestion that the work constituted a reconstruction of the subject 
matter. Thus the taxpayer was successful. 
A similar approach was adopted in the abovementioned case of ITC 1264170 in 
which the taxpayer was obliged by the municipality to change its sewerage 
system171 . Grosskopf J held having established that the work completed did 
not constitute an improvement to the property and the expenditure did not 
amount to a renewal, stated that "(t)he fact that new and different materials 
were used in replB:cing the drainage system is in my view irrelevant" 172. After 
referring to ITC 617173, African Products Manufacturing Company Limited174 
and ITC 520175, the learned judge stated that "by a parity of reasoning, I 
168 ITC 520 (1942) 13 SATC 404 at 406 
169 ITC 520 (1942) 13 SATC 404 at 405 
170 (1977) 39 SATC 133(c) 
171 ITC 1264 (1977) 39 SATC 133 at 133 
172 ITC 1264 (1977) 39 SATC 133 at 137 
173 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
174 (1942) 13 SATC 164 
175 (1942) 13 SATC 404 
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consider it equally irrelevant that the new system worked according to a 
somewhat different method than the one replaced 176. 
Thus as long as the work which involves a change of materials does not fall 
foul of the other requirements of a repair, such expenditure will he deductible. 
CONCURRENT REPAIRS AND IMPROVEMENTS 
Having considered the principles which guide the taxpayer as to what will constitute a 
repair for the purposes of Section 11 ( d), the final issue to be addressed in this regard is 
the legal position when a taxpayer undertakes both repairs and improvements 
simultaneously. 
This issue was addressed in the abovementioned case of ITC 238177. Here the taxpayer 
carried on business in premises which they owned and effected only those repairs 
which could not be delayed. As a result, the business premises became very 
dilapidated. The taxpayer found that in view of the condition of the premises, it was 
necessary to embark on a large scheme of reconstruction and at the same time it was 
decided to take the opportunity of modernising and improving the premises. An 
inclusive contract for all the work was entered into and a proportionate amount of the 
expenditure incurred was claimed as a deduction. This amount represented (A) the 
proportion of the work which could be regarded as repairs - some repairs had been 
undertaken by the taxpayer strictly as repairs178 - and (B) expenditure which had taken 
176 ITC 1264 (1977) 39 SATC 133 at 137 
177 (1932) 6 SATC 353 
178 ITC 238 (1932) 6 SATC 353 at 353 
- 41 -
the place of repairs which would otherwise have been necessary m view of the 
condition of the building179. 
With regards to category (A), those repairs which were undertaken at the same time as 
a scheme of improvement, the court found that certain items claimed as repairs were 
"actually repairs that had been made. There was no question whatsoever on the 
evidence that has been produced to us that those were not repairs and we think that 
those items ought to be allowed to the (taxpayer)" 180. 
In respect of category (B ), the taxpayers claimed that repairs were necessary and 
portions of the building, where the repairs were to have been effected, were replaced. 
Thus they should be allowed to deduct the amounts which they would have had to 
have spent upon the particulars items referred to as repairs pure and simple, 
notwithstanding that a larger amount of expenditure was incurred 181 . 
In other words, the taxpayers had improved their premises while the building was in a 
state of disrepair, the taxpayer did not only restore it to its original state but improved 
it to a condition better than its original condition. The taxpayers claimed that they 
should be allowed to deduct expenditure that restored the building to its original 
condition as repairs and that only expenditure incurred in order to improve the building 
(the difference between the original and final condition) should not be deductible. That 
is, the taxpayers were attempting to deduct notional repair which are described by 
Meyerowitz as "an amount representing costs of notional repairs had they in fact been 
179 ITC 238 (1932) 6 SATC 353 at 353 
180 ITC 238 6 SATC 353 at 355 
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undertaken instead of the reconstruction or improvement" 182. In ITC 23 8183 
~~~~, 
Dr Manfred Nathan KC found in respect of category (B) that "we do not see what 
justifies us, under the Act, in giving the (taxpayers) the right to say that as they 
intended to repair the building, they should be allowed to deduct so much of that figure 
as represents repairs considered independently or permanent structural alterations 
which amounts to capital expenditure. 
"But we are faced with a further difficulty in this case. The whole contract was 
undertaken as one, and it is not possible . . . having regard to the evidence which has 
been tendered to us, to separate the precise items in money so far as each particular 
item of repair is concerned, from the alterations which were undertaken in terms of the 
contract .. . If the contention of the (taxpayer) prevails, we would actually have to go 
so far as to say that repairs could be allowed in respect of a building which had no 
existence that is to say, a building might be completely pulled down, just as portions of 
these particular buildings were pulled down, and then treated as though repairs which 
were originally contemplated had been effected, notwithstanding that they had been 
pulled down, and that the (taxpayers) would be entitled to the benefit of repairs which 
they had originally contemplated making but in actual fact they had not made." 184 
Thus the court clearly rejected the deductibility of notional repairs. As the learned 
judge explained, it would be nonsensical to allow a taxpayer to deduct repairs which 
were never undertaken only because they had once been contemplated. One cannot 
with respect dispute that this would indeed result in anomalies as in the 
181 ITC 238 6 SATC 353 at 355 
182 Meyerowitz: Meyeowitz on Income Tax (1995) par 12.8 
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abovementioned instance where a building is completely destroyed and rebuilt and the 
taxpayer attempts to deduct repairs. Furthermore, on a practical level, in thi.s and 
other cases it would indeed be difficult to separate the expenditure on repairs from the 
globular figure expended by the taxpayer on the renewal or improvement. 
However, while ITC 238 185 clearly rejects the deduction of notional repairs, the court 
did in that case allow the deduction of certain expenditure which was clearly expended 
on repairs (category A). This expenditure could, presumably, easily be distinguished 
from the large scale scheme of reconstruction undertaken by the taxpayer. 
Thus, while notional repairs are not deductible, where repairs were actually effected 
(not just contemplated as in the case of notional repairs), such expenditure can be 
deducted if it can be separated from the scheme of renewal or improvement. Where 
repairs and improvements or renewals are undertaken simultaneously, it is therefore 
essential to determine if the repairs were indeed effected or merely contemplated ( thus 
rendering them notional repairs) as the former may be deductible while the latter are 
not. Meyerowitz seems to agree stating that "where the work consists of both repairs 
and improvements or reconstruction, the costs of the repairs are deductible, but this 
must not be confused with the case where in lieu of repairs an improvement or 
reconstruction is effected". 186 
183 (1932) 6 SATC 353 
184 ITC 238 6 SATC 353 at 357 
185 6 SATC 353 
186 Meyerowitz SC Meyerowitz on Income Tax (1995) page 12 - 9 
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The above approach is the attitude adopted consistently by our courts. In ITC 442187, 
Dr Manfred KC was again asked to consider the deductibility of notional repairs. Here 
the taxpayer erected a new dance hall at an expense of £415 as well as spending £600 
on a new cisterns and lavatory buildings, these latter being erected to replace buildings 
in use for many years in connection with the taxpayers hotel business. The taxpayer 
claimed a deduction of £200 in respect of expenditure on the new dance hall and £400 
in respect of the new cisterns and lavatory buildings, being the amount which the 
taxpayer estimated it would have cost to repair the old building had he not replaced 
them by new buildings. 188 
The learned judge stated that the taxpayer's argument is "that it would have cost the 
amount he is claiming as a deduction to repair the old buildings, and he is claiming the 
imaginary expenses by way of repairs which he seeks to set off' .189 Nathan KC 
continued to state that "(t)here was ... nothing spent on repairs. That is the sole 
ground on which the taxpayer in fact claims the deductions. But, as I have said, it is 
purely imaginary expense". 190 After quoting the ratio of the abovementioned case of 
ITC 238 191, the learned judge continued to state that ITC 238192 "appears to be 
applicable exactly to this case. Therefore . . . it is clear that no deduction can be 
allowed ... "193 . 
187 (1939) 11 SATC 78 
188 ITC 442 (1939) 11 SATC 78 at 78 
189 ITC 442 (1939) 11 SATC 78 at 79 
190 ITC 442 (1939) 11 SATC 78 at 79 
191 (1932) 6 SATC 353 
192 (1932) 6 SATC 353 
193 ITC 442 (1939) 11 SATC 78 at 79 
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Thus ITC 442194 entirely endorses the approach in ITC 238195 . 
In the aforementioned case of ITC 915 196, the taxpayer owned a commercial building 
which had a lean-to type of corrugated iron roof which was leaking. On the 
recommendation of an architect, it was decided to re-use the iron of the roof after re-
rolling but to change the lean-to structure to a rigid roof It was also necessary to 
replace certain purlins which had split. The change in the roof shape required the use 
of new trusses, additional iron sheeting, ridging and piping as well as substantial other 
consequential expenditure. The new roof was, in the opinion of the architect, better 
than it was new and likely to last longer. 197 The taxpayer claimed the entire costs of 
constructing the new roof as a deductible repair. 
Having found that the construction of the new roof constituted an improvement not a 
repair198, J.C.R. Fieldsend stated that "the only remaining points to consider is whether 
any portion of the expenditure can be allowed as a cost of repair . . . It is clear from 
such a case as Nyasaland Railways Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes 1957 R&N 889199 
that when improvement work coincides with the need for repair, a taxpayer cannot be 
allowed to deduct that portion of the cost of the work which would have been incurred 
had he effected repairs rather than the improvements - what has been referred to as the 
notional costs of repairs ... but from Highland Railway Co. v Balderston 2TC 485 it 
seems that if the costs of repairs actually effected can be segregated from the costs of 
improvement, the former can be allowed as a deduction. But such costs must be 
194 (1939) 11 SATC 78 
195 6 SATC 353 
196 (1960) 24 SATC 219 
197 ITC 915 (1960) 24 SATC 219 at 219 
198 ITC 915 (1960) 24 SATC 219 at 220 to 221 
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capable of being clearly segregated; for example in the present case the cost of 
removing and replacing the iron was something that had to be met in order to effect 
the improvements to the structure of the roof, whereas the cost of re-rolling and 
cleaning the iron was entirely independent of any such reconstruction 11 200 . 
The above distinction between notional repairs and repairs conducted concurrently 
with an improvement or renewal is clearly in line with the previous judgment. The 
learned judge turned to the facts and found that re-rolling and cleaning the iron was 
"not part of the operation of producing a roof better than that originally in position but 
was undertaken to restore the roof to its original condition. For these reasons I think 
that the cost of re-rolling and cleaning the iron, but not of removing and replacing it, 
which cannot be segregated from the improvement scheme, can be allowed as a 
deduction. "201 J. C.R. Fieldsend found that the cost of replacing purlins could similarly 
be allowed as their replacement "did nothing more than restore them to their original 
condition"202. However, the cost of the labour of removing and replacing them was 
not allowable as it could not be segregated from the improvement scheme203 . The 
learned judge then noted that the taxpayer's case had not been presented on the basis 
that certain items of work were severable from the improvement and no evidence 
specifically dealt with the cost of each of the two items. Thus he referred the matter 
back to the Commissioner for reassessment on the basis that the costs of re-rolling and 
cleaning the iron of new purlins was allowable204 
199 ITC 885 (1959) 22 SATC 195 
200 ITC 915 (1960) 24 SATC 219 at 221 
201 ITC 915 (1960) 24 SATC 219 at 221 
202 ITC 915 (1960) 24 SATC 219 at 221 
203 ITC 915 (1960) 24 SATC 219 at 221 
204 ITC 915 (1960) 24 SATC 219 at 221 
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Thus while the interpretation of the law by the learned judge in ITC 916 was with 
respect, in line with previous cases, the application of the principles to the facts is 
significant. The court seems keen to apportion expenditure between repairs and 
improvements even where the taxpayer had not raised the issue. Furthermore, the 
criteria for segregation between a repair and improvement seem relatively easy to 
comply with. The taxpayer constructed a new roof - it would clearly have been 
possible for the court merely to regard the new roof as an improvement and disallow 
any deductions in relation thereto. However, the court investigated the material used 
to construct the roof and discovered that the iron from the existing roof had been re-
rolled and cleaned and used for the new roof The court, as mentioned above, allowed 
the cost of doing so as a repair as the taxpayer was merely restoring the iron to its 
original condition. Similarly the costs of purlins could be deducted as the existing 
purlins had deteriorated and required replacing. However, by contrast the learned 
judge found that removing and replacing the iron was part of the scheme of 
improvement and was not deductible. 
Therefore the court considered what expenditure had actually been incurred which 
would in any event have been incurred had the taxpayer merely undertaken to repair 
his roof and allowed such expenditure. These were not notional repairs as they had 
actually been incurred. This seems, with respect, to be the correct approach to the 
segregation between repairs and improvements or renewals - if the expenditure 
qualifies as a repair, such expenditure should be deductible regardless of whether the 
taxpayer had simultaneously undertaken to repair or reconstruct his property. 
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A further case which considers repairs and improvements or renewals undertaken 
contemporaneously is that of ITC 1457205 . The taxpayer in this matter owned a 
building which had shops on the ground floor below a single floor of residential flats. 
The shops were in good condition but the flats had fallen into a state of disrepair. 
After a feasibility study in 1984 concluded that it would be uneconomic to repair the 
upper floor, the taxpayer decided to convert the upper floor into offices for use as a 
medical centre by doctors. This was completed in 1985206 . The total cost of the 
conversion was R216 800.00, the taxpayer claimed that the sum spent on repairs was 
R98 123.27. 
The Commissioner for Inland Revenue contended that "although certain of the items 
might have been properly categorised as repair, these were carried out as part and 
parcel of a contract to convert the first floor from flats to offices for medical 
practitioners under one contract and it is not possible in the circumstances for purposes 
of Section 11 ( d) of the Income Tax Act to apportion or dissect the global contract 
price to allow of a deduction of portion of the price for repairs and maintenance." 
It is submitted that all the work was done in the course of one contract of 
reconstruction on the first floor and that it cannot be said that repairs of defective parts 
of the building as such, were carried out11207• 
205 (1989) 51 SATC 131 
206 ITC 1457 (1989) 51 SATC 131 at 131 to 132 
207 ITC 1457 (1989) 51 SATC 131 at 135 to 136 
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The learned judge Melamet J stated that he "did not understand the representative for 
the Commissioner for Inland Revenue, apart from the extent, to contend that the 
premises were not in a state of disrepair alleged and required repair but that these were 
not carried out but an improvement in the course of reconstruction was effected". 208 
The court continued to quote from Meyerowitz & Spiro on Income Tax in South 
Africa Permanent Volume paragraph 743 which states that "(w)here the work consists 
of both repairs and improvements or reconstruction, the costs of repairs are 
deductible" .209 
Melamet J quoted from ITC 906210 and ITC 1038211 at 136 where "it was decided 
similarly where it is possible to segregate the cost of repairs from that of 
reconstruction, this should be done and it should not be thwarted by the fact that one 
of these operations was more costly or substantial then the other. It does not mean 
that the deductibility of the costs of the smaller operation is to be determined by the 
reference to the nature of a larger operation"212. The learned judge then stated that 
certain expenditure "although done at the same time as the major conversation of the 
first floor, were not an essential part of such scheme and were necessary for the repair 
of the first floor irrespective of the conversion and were done at the same ,time as being 
convenient and being more cost effective so to have been done". 213 Thus this 
expenditure was deductible as a repair. 
208 ITC 1457 (1989) 51 SATC 131 at 136 
209 ITC 1457 (1989) 51 SATC 131 at 137 
210 (1959) 24 SATC 90 
211 (1965) 26 SATC 123 
212 ITC 1457 (1989) 51 SATC 131 at 137 
213 ITC 1457 (1989) 51 SATC 131 at 137 
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This case reiterates that one may deduct expenditure spent on repairs which were 
simultaneously undertaken with improvements or renewals if it can be separated. The 
learned judge. states that the repairs done were not an essential part of the scheme of 
improvement or reconstruction. This seems to imply that in order to distinguish 
between repairs and improvements or reconstruction, one must consider if such 
expenditure was in fact essential for the scheme of improvement or reconstruction. 
The court thus seems to approach the segregation of repairs and improvements or 
reconstruction from the opposite angle of that of the court in ITC 915214. In the 
present case the court is determining what is not essential for the scheme of 
improvement or reconstruction to determine what is a repair (the starting point is the 
scheme of reconstruction). While in ITC 915215 the court determined what was a 
repair in order to determine what did not fall into the scheme of reconstruction or 
improvement (the starting point was the repairs). It is submitted that this is merely a 
question of perspective and the results should be the same. 
The law is thus clear. Notional repairs are not deductible while distinguishable repairs 
undertaken simultaneously with improvements or reconstruction are. 
We have thus addressed the issue of what constitutes a repair for the purposes of 
Section 1 l(d). One must consider what a repair is in terms of physical deterioration as 
well as bearing in mind the principles of ITC 617216 . However, expenditure is not 
deductible in terms of Section 11 ( d) merely because it constitutes a repair. 
214 (1960) 24 SATC 219 
215 (1960) 24 SATC 219 
216 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
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(7) THE TRADE REQUIREMENT 
Section 11 ( d), as mentioned above, states that there shall be allowed as deductions 
"expenditure actually incurred during the year of assessment on repairs of property 
occupied for the purpose of trade or in respect of which income is receivable". Thus, 
as mentioned above, deductions in terms of Section 11 ( d) are only allowed in respect 
of a taxpayer's property if such property is utilised for the purpose of trade. It is thus 
vital to investigate when a taxpayer has fulfilled this trade requirement.· In terms of the 
Act repairs are only deductible if the property is either occupied for the purpose of 
trade or is a property in respect of which income is receivable. 
The firs~ category of property is property from which the taxpayer carries on his trade. 
As Silke points out217, this requirement is confirmed by Section 26(b) which does not 
permit the deduction of any cost of repair of any premises not occupied for the 
purposes of trade or of any dwelling house or domestic premises, except that part that 
is occupied for the purposes of trade218 . Furthermore, a court has interpreted the 
expression "for the purpose of trade" as meaning "for the purpose of enabling a person 
to carry on and earn profits in the trade"219 . 
The second category of property in respect of which repairs are deductible in terms of 
Section 11 ( d) is property in respect of which income is receivable. Clearly where a 
taxpayer is leasing his property, such property constitutes property in respect of which 
-
217 A. De Koker Silke on South African Income Tax Volume II 8.100 
218 A. De Koker Silke on South African Income Tax Volume II 8.100 
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income is receivable. However, whether the taxpayer's property falls within such 
category can be problematic where a taxpayer repairs premises before concluding a 
lease with a tenant or before such tenant moves in. It is not clear whether in the above 
instances the repairs were effected to property in respect of which income was 
receivable. 
In ITC 163 220 the court considered whether the repairs effected after a lease had been 
signed but before the tenant had moved in were deductible221 . The court held that 
"premises in need of repair will in all probability not produce the same rental as 
premises in a good state of repair. In the present case the repairs were necessary in 
order to produce the rentals and to my mind it matters not that such repairs were 
executed before occupation of the premises was actually taken. I do not think that any 
distinction should be drawn between the case where a lessee insists on repairs being 
executed during his tenancy and the case where a lessee insists on repairs being 
instituted before he takes possession. But for the undertaking to effect the repairs 
there may have been no lease at the rental agreed upon. A distinction must clearly be 
drawn between the expenses incurred in order to put the premises wholly unfit to 
produce income in such a condition as to be able to earn income, and the facts of this 
case. The premises in question were occupied by the tenant and her family and merely 
required certain repairs in order to earn the income stipulated for in the lease. The 
question stated above should, therefore, I think, be answered in the affirmative. 
219 Strong & Co. ofRomsey Ltd v Woodifield (Surveyor of Taxes) [1906 AC 448, 5 TC 215 as in 
A De Koker: Silke on South African Income Tax Volume II 8.100 
220 (1930) 5 SATC 77 
221 ITC 163 (1930) 5 SATC 77 
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But I also incline to the view that the expenditure falls within sub-section 2( c) of 
Section 11 as being a sum "expended for the repair of property in_ respect of which 
income is receivable". As soon as the lease was signed, income became receivable 
from the property from the date on which occupation was to be signed to the lessee; it 
then became a rent-producing asset. For these reasons I think the appellant was 
entitled to deduct the sum claimed and the appeal accordingly succeeds"222 . Thus the 
court held that the property fell within the predecessor of Section 11 ( d) as soon as the 
lease was signed. There was no distinction drawn between repairs effected before or 
during a lessee's tenancy. However, the court did caution that the property could not 
be "wholly unfit to produce income"223, a principle echoed in future cases. 
The issue of whether property constitutes property m respect of which rent is 
receivable before such property is let was addressed in ITC 243224. In this case the 
taxpayer purchased a house in the Cape Peninsula. At the time when he bought it, the 
house was in a state of disrepair. The walls were damp, the floors sagging, the 
veranda leaking and the water pipes were corroded. As the taxpayer could not occupy 
the house himself he was anxious to obtain a tenant. He was, however, advised by an 
agent that although several people had inspected the property, they had refused to 
lease it unless it was put into a proper state of repair. The taxpayer accordingly spent 
the amount required for the necessary repairs and thereafter secured tenants.. He 
claimed his expenditure in this regard as a deduction. 225 
222 ITC 163 (1930) 5 SATC 77 at 78 
223 ITC 163 (1930) 5 SATC 77 at 78 
224 (1932) 6 SATC 370 
225 ITC 243 (1932) 6 SATC 370 at 370 
- 54 -
After noting that "the courts have had great difficulty in determining the words "is 
receivable"226 in reference to the then equivalent of Section ll(d), Dr Nathan 
Manfred KC considers various dictionary definitions of the term "is receivable". He 
concludes that "from all these dictionaries it appears that the main meaning of 
receivable is "capable of being received". If this is so, receivable certainly has not as its 
primary meaning definitely to be received, but merely capable of being received. It 
would have been otherwise if sub-section (c) of Section 11(1) (the equivalent of 
Section (d)) had stated "in respect of which income is receiv.ed or is to be received". It 
merely means that the property must be in a state, or property of such a kind from 
which income may be received. That being the primary meaning, we come to the 
conclusion that this is an allowable deduction. There is an undoubted expenditure on 
repairs, and according to the meaning of the word "receivable" it does not follow that 
at the exact date there must be an agreement for the receipt of income. In fact in this 
particular case income was received in respect of this property during the portion of 
the tax year in question. The results may be unfortunate for the revenue but we are 
compelled to give effect to the meaning of the words as they appear in the Acf' 227 . 
This case clearly states that property falls within the ambit of Section 11 ( d) - is 
property in respect of which income is receivable in two situations. Either the property 
is in a condition consistent with income being capable of being received or is of the 
. ~ of property from which income may be received. Thus presumably a property 
which is in a dilapidated state and could thus not be let in the year of assessment will 
' still fall within the ambit of Section 11 ( d) if the property is of the kind which receives 
226 ITC 243 (1932) 6 SATC 370 at 371 
227 ITC 243 (1932) 6 SATC 370 at 370 
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mcome. This is a wider definition than that in ITC 163228 which requires that the 
property not be unfit to produce income. Furthermore, while ITC 163229 addressed a 
situation where the taxpayer had already concluded a lease, in this case no lease had 
been entered into, yet such property was held to be property in respect of which 
income was receivable. 
There have been subsequent cases which have held positions contrary to those in the 
above cases. In ITC 561 230.. for example, the taxpayers owned a large country 
residence as well as two farms. The residence was unoccupied during the year of 
assessment but unsuccessful attempts were made to find a tenant for the property 
during the year of assessment. , The taxpayer sought to deduct the costs of certain 
expenditure, incurred in respect of the residence231 . 
C.J. Ingram stated that "income receivable seems to me clearly to connect with income 
in connection with a lettable proposition. So if a landlord sublets a warehouse and rent 
is received from that, that rent is taxable, and repairs in connection with the property 
from which the income is received is allowable. But if the property stands empty and 
no income is received from it, there is no income received from it, there is no income 
receivable in respect of it, and in terms of this section, no deduction for repairs is 
allowable"232 . The learned judge's approach in this case is with respect confused. 
Initially he points out that income is receivable if the property is a lettable proposition, 
an approach which seems to be in line with previous cases. However, CJ. Ingram 
228 (1980) 6 SATC 77 
229 (1930) 6 SATC 77 
230 (1944) 13 SATC 313 
231 ITC 561 (1944) 13 SATC 313 as in Emslie: Income Tax Cases and Materials (1995 p693 
232 ITC 561 (1944) 13 SATC 313 at 315 
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KC. continues to give examples of what he considers to be lettable propositions which 
clearly illustrate that what he is equating income receivable with income received - "if 
the property stands empty and no income is received from it, there is no income 
receivable in respect of it"233 . This approach clearly runs contrary to that of 
ITC 163234 and ITC 243235 which interprets income receivable to mean capable of 
receiving income not having received income. 
The approach of ITC 561 236 is, however, endorsed by ITC 665237 . Here the taxpayer 
owned properties. From one of the properties he obtained £550.00 rent during the 
year of assessment in question and incurred expenditure amounting to £422.00 which 
consisted mainly of repairs. In respect of the other property no rent was received but 
expenses amounting to £244. 00 were incurred238 . The taxpayer attempted to deduct 
the total expenditure of £666.00. The Commissioner for Inland Revenue disallowed 
the deduction of expenses with regard to the second property. 
B.O:K. Beyers, Acting President of the Transvaal Additional Special Income Tax 
Court held that "no income was derived from (the second) property during the 
' 
1945/46 year and accordingly the expenditure was not incurred in the production of 
any income"239 . Furthermore, he stated that ITC 561 240 is "in point241 . The appeal was 
accordingly dismissed. 
233 ITC 561 (1944) 13 SATC 313 at 315 
234 (1930) 5 SATC 77 
235 (1932) 6 SATC 370 
236 (1944) 13 SATC 315 
237 (1948) 16 SATC 127 
238 ITC 665 (1948) 16 SATC 127 at 127 
239 ITC 665 (1948) 16 SATC 127 at 128 
240 (1944) 13 SATC 313 
241 ITC 665 (1948)16 SATC 127 at 128 
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Clearly the determining factor in this case was that no income had been received. Thus 
there are clearly two opposing lines of cases. ITC 163242 and ITC 243243 approach the 
question of whether the property was one in respect of which income is receivable 
from the perspective of whether rent was capable of being received from the property 
as opposed to ITC 561 244 and ITC 665245 which required income to be received before 
the expenditure fell within the ambit of Section 11 ( d). 
It is my belief that his debate was resolved in ITC 1475246 . The taxpayer in this matter 
previously lived with his family in a home owned by him in suburb A His wife found 
travelling to and from her place of work daily to be too onerous and the taxpayer 
decided to buy a new home closer to her place of work. In August 1984 he bought a 
townhouse in B. He decided to retain his old house in A as an investment and let it out 
so that he could recover additional income therefrom. With a view to obtaining the 
best possible return he decided to effect certain repairs and improvements to the 
property247 . Although most of the repairs were executed in the year ending 28 
February 1985, the Commissioner claimed that the taxpayer had not carried on the 
trade of letting property during that year of assessment as the property had not been let 
during the financial year ending February 1985. In fact the taxpayer had advertised for 
a lessee in January 1995 and he let the house in February or March 1985 with the 
lessee taking occupation 1 April 1985 and the taxpayer receiving first payment of 
242 (1930) 5 SATC 77 
243 (1932) 6 SATC 370 
244 (1948) 16 SATC 227 
245 (1944) 13 SATC 313 
246 (1989) 52 SATC 135 
247 ITC 1475 (1989) 52 SATC 135 at 135 
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rental in March 1985248 . The Commissioner for Inland Revenue disallowed· the 
deduction of expenditure spent on repairs. 
Leveson J stated that "the enquiry in this matter turns upon the meaning to be given to 
the expression income is receivable. It is common cause that no rental was actually 
received during the financial year. The meaning of "receivable" in the Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary is capable of being received. The question to be decided, wher_e no 
rental is paid, is whether it can be said that rental is capable of being received in the 
case of property which is unoccupied while repairs are being executed but not because 
of that fact but because the taxpayer had been unsuccessful in finding a lessee 11 249. 
The court, in order to answer the above question considered ITC 163 250 stating that 
"(t)he ratio appears to have been that income was receivable for the property as soon 
as the lease was signed although occupation was only taken at a later date" 251 . The 
learned judge then turned to the judgment of ITC 243 252 where the court held that the 
meaning of receivable is II capable of being received 11253 . 
Turning to the facts Leveson J stated that "(t)he question now is when, for the 
purposes of Section ll(d), can it be said that he has commenced trading"254 . He 
continued to state that the taxpayer had "formed the intention to use the property for 
the purpose of trade long before he vacated it. ... he advertised for a lessee long before 
248 ITC 1475 (1989) 52 SATC 135 at 137 
249 ITC 1475 (1989) 52 SATC 135 at 135 
250 (1930) 5 SATC 77 
251 ITC 1475 (1989) 52 SATC 135 at 139 
252 (1932) 6 SATC 370 
253 ITC 1475 (1989) 52 SATC 135 at 139 
254 ITC 1475 (1989) 52 SATC 135 at 140 
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the repairs were completed . . . the premises were habitable when he vacated . . . the 
premises were in a lettable condition when he vacated, bearing in mind that he and his 
family had lived there comfortably until the date of vacation". Leveson J considered 
the contention by the Commissioner for Inland Revenue that ITC 561 255 applied stating 
that 'the essence of the judgment is that if no income is received from the property 
"there is no income receivable in respect of it'. The approach seems to overlook the 
above quoted dictionary meaning of "receivable" and compels me to say that I prefer 
the decision in the case ofITC 243"256 . 
The appeal was thus allowed with costs. 
It is submitted therefore that ITC 1475257 settles the divide between ITC 163258 and 
ITC 243259 on the one hand and ITC 561 260 and ITC 665261 on the other. 
Leveson J quite clearly has come down in favour of interpreting income receivable as 
"capable of being received" not having been received. This seems with respect to be 
the sensible approach. Requiring the taxpayer to have actually received income from 
his property before the property is regarded as one from which income is receivable 
seems to do violence against the language of the Act. 
255 (1944) 13 SATC 313 
256 ITC 1475 52 SATC 135 at 141 
257 (1989) 52 SATC 135 
258 (1930) 5 SATC 77 
259 (1932) 6 SATC 370 
260 (1944) 13 SATC 313 
261 (1948) 16 SATC 227 
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The final issue to be addressed is whether repairs to a property after the tenant has 
vacated such property are deductible. 
This issue was considered in ITC 643262. Here a taxpayer had let out his home for 
some years while he was in active military service. On reoccupying his premises on 
1 October 1944, he discovered that they required extensive repairs as a result of the 
treatment to which they had been subjected by the tenant in his absence. He repaired 
_,.. 
his premises, after resuming occupation, during the year of assessment ending 
30 June 1945 at the cost of £106.00. During the 1945 year of assessment, he had 
received £ 13. 1 Os 0d rental income and he attempted to deduct the costs of repairs 
caused by the tenants from this amount. The taxpayers claim was disallowed and he 
thus appealed to the Special Court263 . 
In presenting his case, the taxpayer II agreed that during the period in which the repairs 
were effected, the property was not occupied for the purposes of trade but he 
contended that the deduction was admissible in that the expenditure was incurred in 
respect of property in respect of which income is receivable . . . he argued that on· the 
meaning of the term receivable his case fell within the ambit of the sub-section, in that 
rent had been receivable by him during the tax year. 11264 
262 (1947) 15 SATC 243 
263 Emslie et al: Income Tax Cases and Materials (1995) p 698 - 699 
264 ITC 643 (1947) 15 SATC 243 at 244 
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Referring to the case ofITC 243265 C.J. Ingram KC noted that the above case held that 
the main meaning of "receivable" is "capable of being received 11 266 . The learned judge 
continued to state that the taxpayer would not be successful in the present matter as his 
expenditure fell foul of Section 12(g), the predecessor of the present day 
Section 23(g), in that the expenditure was not incurred for the purposes of trade.267. 
C.J. Ingram KC noted that the above sub-section envisages that the monies must be 
expended for the purpose of "restoring th~ income - producing asset to a condition that 
it will be capable of continuing to earn income as previously"268 . 
Turning to the facts, the learned judge noted that it was "admitted by the (taxpayer) 
that he had on re-occupation of his property ceased to carry on the trade of letting and 
had no intention of letting in the future. Hence it is impossible to hold that the repairs 
were effected for the purposes of trade"269. Thus the taxpayer's appeal was dismissed. 
Thus repairs by a taxpayer after he ceases letting his property will not be deductible. 
The prudent taxpayer will therefore repair his property before such lease ends. 
In order for repairs to comply with the trade requirements of Section 11 ( d) therefore, 
the property repairs must be occupied for the purposes of trade or in respect of which 
income is receivable, that is, capable of being received. Furthermore, repairs to 
265 (1932) 5 SATC 370 
266 ITC 643 (1947) 15 SATC 243 at 245 
267 ITC 643 (1947) 15 SATC 243 at 243 
268 ITC 643 (1947) 13 SATC 343 at 345 
269 ITC 643 (1947) 13 SATC 343 at 345 
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property after the lease has expired and where the taxpayer has no intention to relet the 
property will fall foul of the trade requirements. 
(8) CONCLUSION 
Thus, in order for a taxpayer to take advantage of Section ll(d), one must carefully 
plan repairs to one's property. 
For example, repatrs must be on such a grand scale as to constitute a renewal. 
Furthermore, if repairs are conducted contemporaneously with improvements or 
renewals, the repairs must be easily distinguishable from the latter. Such expenditure 
should be undertaken while income is receivable from the premises not once one has 
ceased letting ones property. 
Generally, if one keeps in mind the abovementioned principles contained in ITC 617270 
and the trade requirement, one should hopefully be able to enjoy the deduction 
contained in Section 1 l(d). 
270 (1946) 14 SATC 474 
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